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THE REPRESENTATIVE CONSUMER IN THE NEOCLASSICAL 
GROWTH MODEL WITH IDIOSYNCRATIC SHOCKS 
 
Lilia Maliar and Serguei Maliar 
 
A B S T R A C T 
This paper studies a complete-market version of the neoclassical growth 
model, where agents face idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. We show that if 
agents possess identical preferences of either the CRRA or the addilog type, 
then the heterogeneous-agent economy behaves as if there was a representative 
consumer who faces three kinds of shocks, to preferences, to technology and to 
labor. We calibrate and simulate the constructed representative-consumer 
models. We find that idiosyncratic uncertainty can have a non-negligible effect 
on aggregate labor-market fluctuations. 
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Many recent papers have studied the implications of heterogeneous-agent
models where agents experience idiosyncratic shocks to their earnings, e.g.,
Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Kydland (1995), Castañeda, Díaz-Giménez
and Ríos-Rull (1998), Krusell and Smith (1998). The analysis of equilibrium
in models with idiosyncratic uncertainty relies on numerical methods and can
be fairly complicated, especially if idiosyncratic shocks are correlated across
agents and thus, have a non-trivial eﬀect on aggregate dynamics. This paper
presents a complete-market aggregation result, which under the standard
restrictions on preferences, can simplify the equilibrium characterization: we
can restore the equilibrium in a heterogeneous-agent economy essentially by
solving a one-consumer model. In particular, we can easily study the eﬀect
of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks on the aggregate dynamics.
Our analysis is carried out in the context of a heterogeneous-agent variant
of the standard neoclassical growth model by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
Our aggregation result is as follows: If agents possess identical preferences
of either the CRRA or the addilog type, then the heterogeneous-agent econ-
omy behaves as if there was a representative consumer who faces three kinds
of shocks, to preferences, to technology and to labor. Speciﬁc assumptions
about wealth distribution and the process for idiosyncratic shocks do not
aﬀect the structure of the constructed representative-consumer model but
merely the stochastic properties of shocks in such a model. We shall empha-
size that ”shocks from aggregation” appear as a consequence of the assump-
tion of idiosyncratic uncertainty and are not present in the representative-
consumer models, constructed under the assumption of time-invariant in-
dividual characteristics, as in, e.g., Chatterjee (1994), Atkeson and Ogaki
(1996), Caselli and Ventura (2000), Maliar and Maliar (2000, 2001).
A starting point for our analysis is the result of aggregation in the equi-
librium point by Constantinides (1982), who shows that if a representative
consumer is to replicate the aggregate behavior of a heterogeneous-agent
economy for just one ﬁxed wealth distribution and for just one ﬁxed (equi-
librium) price vector, then the representative consumer exists with virtually
no restrictions on the individual preferences. This result is shown in two
steps: First, the heterogeneous consumers are replaced by a social planner
who maximizes the weighted sum of the individual utility functions, and sec-
ondly, the planner is replaced by a ”composite” consumer who maximizes a
”social utility function” of aggregate quantities. With the welfare weights
2in the inverse proportion to the equilibrium marginal utilities of consump-
tion, the constructed one-consumer model yields the aggregate equilibrium
allocation in the decentralized economy.
Under the construction of Constantinides (1982), the social utility func-
tion is deﬁned implicitly, as a maximum point of the weighted sum of the
individual utility functions. In terms of our model, this deﬁnition implies
that the social utility function depends on the aggregate quantities, the dis-
tribution of welfare weights and the distribution of labor productivities. In
general, there is no easy way of characterizing the relationship between the
distributions and the shape of the social utility function. To know what the
social utility function looks like, we need, essentially, to solve for the equi-
librium in the heterogeneous-agent economy. In some cases, however, it is
possible to construct the social utility function analytically. Our examples of
aggregation are precisely two such cases. The property, which is common to
both our examples, is that the functional form of the social utility function
is invariant to changes in the distributions of welfare weights and productivi-
ties; the distributions aﬀect only the parameters of the social utility function.
Our results lie somewhere between Gorman’s (1953) exact aggregation, when
social preferences are the same for all distributions of individual characteris-
tics, and Constantinides’s (1982) aggregation in the equilibrium point, when
the social preferences depend on the distribution of individual characteristics
in a manner, which is diﬃcult to characterize.
With the aggregation result in hand, we can easily investigate quantitative
predictions of models with, literally, millions of agents. We therefore com-
plement the theoretical analysis by studying the implications of a calibrated
version of our model. We assume that the process for idiosyncratic shocks is
given by the sum of the individual and aggregate components. We calibrate
the individual characteristics by using data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID). The aggregate component is chosen so that the process for
technology shocks, in our heterogeneous-agent model, is identical to the one
used in the literature for parametrizing the benchmark homogeneous-agent
setup. The remaining parameters are ﬁxed so that the model reproduces
selected time series observations on the U.S. economy. We ﬁnd that in both
the CRRA and addilog cases, the impact of the preference shocks on the
aggregate dynamics is quantitatively small. The eﬀect associated with the
labor shocks is, however, sizeable. Such shocks can signiﬁcantly increase the
volatility of working hours and can lead to acyclical or even countercyclical
behavior of labor productivity.
3The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 formulates a heterogeneous-
agent model. Section 3 derives aggregation results under the assumptions of
the CRRA and addilog types of preferences. Section 4 describes the method-
ology of the numerical analysis and discusses the simulation results, and
ﬁnally, Section 5 concludes.
2T h e e c o n o m y
Time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite, T =0 ,1,...,∞. The environment
is composed of a set of heterogeneous agents S =[ 0 ,1]. Heterogeneity is in
the dimensions of initial endowment and skills. The measure of agent s in the
set S is dωs, and the total measure is normalized to one,
U
S dωs =1 . Agents
receive random shocks to skills. We use β
s
t to denote the level of skills of agent




s∈S,f o l l o w saﬁrst-order Markov process with transitional probability
Π{Bt+1 = B  | Bt = B}B ,B∈ ,w h e r e ⊂RS
+. Idiosyncratic shocks to skills
of diﬀerent agents can be correlated. The economy starts out with B0 ∈  .
In each period t,a ni n ﬁnitely-lived agent s ∈ S chooses consumption, cs
t,
and leisure, ls
t, to maximize the expected discounted sum of the period utility
functions. The discount factor is δ ∈ (0,1). The period utility function,
u(cs
t,l s
t), is continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments,
a n ds t r i c t l yc o n c a v e .T h ea g e n ti se n d o w e dw i t ho n eu n i to ft i m ew h i c hc a nbe
split between work, ns
t, and leisure, ls
t =1 −ns
t. The common wage per unit of
eﬃciency labor is wt. The agent also gets income from renting capital, ks
t.T h e
interest rate is rt. The depreciation rate of capital is d ∈ (0,1]. The economy
has a complete set of markets, i.e., the agents can trade state-contingent
claims. The agent’s s portfolio of claims is denoted by {ms
t (B)}B∈  . The
claim of type B ∈ p a y so n eu n i to ft+1consumption good in the state B
and nothing otherwise. The price of such a claim is pt (B).









































where g is the rate of the labor-augmenting technology progress, which is
introduced to allow for the steady state growth of the economy. The operator
Et denotes the expectation, conditional on the information available in period
t. Initial holdings of capital and contingent claims, ks
0 and ms
0, are given.
The output yt is produced according to a two-input production function,
yt = f (kt,N t),w h e r ekt and Nt are the amounts of capital and eﬃciency
labor, respectively. We adopt the common and convenient Cobb-Douglas
speciﬁcation of production f (kt,N t)=kα
t N
1−α
t ,w i t hα ∈ (0,1).G i v e ns u c h
a constant-returns-to-scale parametrization of the production function, the
factor prices rt and wt, relevant for the consumers’ decisions, satisfy the ag-
gregate marginal product conditions: rt = ∂f/∂kt and wt = ∂f/∂Nt. Capital
and labor inputs are given by the sum of capital holdings and eﬃciency labor
of all the agents, kt =
U
S ks













tdωs represents the aggregate (average)

















We will refer to nt and ht as the aggregate physical and aggregate eﬃciency
working hours, respectively. The variables Nt and ht are related as Nt =
gthtβt. The relation between nt and ht will be discussed later on.
In terms of ht, the production function can be written as f (kt,h t)=
θtkα
t (gtht)
1−α,w h e r eθt ≡ β
1−α
t . The economy’s Resource Constraint (RC)
is therefore given by










tdωs is the aggregate consumption.
Formally, a competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a sequence of contin-









5for the prices {pt (B),r t,w t}B∈ ,t∈T, for aggregate factor inputs {kt,h t}t∈T








B∈ ,t∈T solves the utility
maximization problem (1), (2) of each consumer s; (ii) {rt,w t}t∈T are given
by the marginal productivities of aggregate capital and labor; (iii) markets
for goods, capital, labor and contingent claims clear. Moreover, the plans
are such that cs
t ≥ 0,a n d1 ≥ ns
t ≥ 0 for all s, t,a n drt,w t,k t > 0 for all
t. We restrict our attention to an interior equilibrium. We assume that such
an equilibrium exists and that it is unique.
3 The representative consumer
In an economy with complete markets and without distortions, a competitive
equilibrium is Pareto optimal, which is established by the ﬁrst fundamental
theorem of welfare economics (see, e.g., Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green,
1995, Ch. 16). We can therefore infer the equilibrium from the associated
planner’s problem. For the purpose of constructing the representative con-
sumer, it is convenient to represent the planner’s problem in the form of two
subproblems. The ﬁrst subproblem is to distribute the aggregate consump-
tion and working hours between the heterogeneous agents, which delivers the

















































+ is a given distribution of welfare weights, with the mean
normalized to one, for convenience,
U
S λ
sdωs =1 . The second subproblem is

















The following proposition characterizes the exact relationship between the
decentralized and the planner’s economies.
6Proposition 1 For any distribution of initial endowments in the decentral-
ized economy (1) − (4), there exists a distribution of welfare weights in the
planner’s economy (5), (6), such that a competitive equilibrium is a solution
to the planner’s problem.1
Proof. See Appendix A.  
The above construction of the planner’s problem has a long history, which
dates back to Samuelson (1956), who introduced the notion of a social utility
function. Negishi (1961) pointed out that the competitive equilibrium can
be found by maximizing the weighted sum of the individual utility functions,
subject to the economy’s resource constraint. Finally, Constantinides (1982)
singled out a subproblem of the planner’s problem that deﬁnes the social
utility function.
As pointed out in Constantinides (1982), the function U can be inter-
preted as the utility function of one composite consumer. Indeed, the one-
consumer model (6), by construction, rationalizes the equilibrium behavior
of aggregate variables observed in the decentralized economy. In general,
the shape of the social utility function will ”depend on the equilibrium”,
or, in other words, on the speciﬁc distributions of welfare weights and la-
bor productivities. The consequence is that we need, essentially, to solve
for the equilibrium ﬁrst-which involves exploring the interaction between
preferences and the associated heterogeneity-to know what the social utility
function looks like. Although the division of the planner’s problem into two
subproblems simpliﬁes the task (it allows us to compute the social utility
function by solving a static optimization problem, and not a dynamic one),
the numerical computation can be still burdensome.
It is therefore of interest to distinguish the cases in which the social prefer-
ences can be constructed analytically. The well-known example in the litera-
ture is Gorman’s (1953) aggregation, in which the preferences of the economy
as a whole do not depend on the wealth distribution (or, equivalently, on the
welfare weights distribution). If agents diﬀer only in wealth, the existence of
Gorman’s (1953) representative consumer requires that the individual prefer-
ences are similarly quasi-homothetic (homothetic and identical up to possibly
diﬀerent translated origins). However, if agents are subject to idiosyncratic
1The correspondence between the distribution of initial endowments and the distribu-
tion of welfare weights is deﬁned by the consumers’ expected lifetime budget constraints
(see Maliar and Maliar, 2001, for a discussion).
7productivity shocks, Gorman’s (1953) aggregation is not possible even if the
individual preferences are similarly quasi-homothetic.
It turns out that in some cases, we can derive the social utility function
without having Gorman’s (1953) representative consumer. Below, we estab-
lish two such cases. Their common property is that the functional form of the
social utility function is invariant to changes in the distributions of welfare
weights and productivities; even though the distributions are part of the so-
cial utility function, they enter in a simple way, aﬀecting only the preference
parameters. We refer to our construction as ”aggregation” and call the con-
structed consumer ”representative”, though this terminology does not have
the standard meaning, as employed in the literature on aggregation.
Before presenting the results, we shall illustrate our aggregation technique
by way of an example. It turns out that the simplest possible setup, for which
our aggregation works, is not the one with productivity shocks but the one
with preference shocks.
Example 1 Consider a version of the economy of Section 2, in which
there is no long-run growth. The skills of all agents are identical, β
s
t = βt for
all s, and leisure is not valuable, ns







t),w h e r eφ
s
t is an individual-speciﬁcs h o c kt o
preferences that follows a ﬁrst-order Markov process. In such an economy,










































where zt is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. This


















































































. Hence, we have a closed-form solution for
the social utility function, where the variable φt can be interpreted as a shock
to preferences of the representative consumer.  
We now turn back to the economy with idiosyncratic shocks to skills. We
present the aggregation results for two cases: one when agents have identical
preferences of the CRRA type, and the other when agents have identical
preferences of the addilog type. The former preferences are homothetic,
while the latter are non-homothetic.



















, 1 >µ>0, η > 0.
(8)
The aggregation result here, is as follows:
































Proof. See Appendix A.  
Since the CRRA utility function (8) is quasi-homothetic, in the economy
where agents diﬀer only in wealth, we must have Gorman’s (1953) represen-
tative consumer. Indeed, if there are no diﬀerences in skills, i.e., bs
t =1for
9all t, s,w eh a v et h a tΛt is constant. Premultiplying the preferences by a
constant is a linear transformation of preferences and does not aﬀect the so-
lution. Hence, the aggregate allocation does not depend on a speciﬁcw e a l t h
distribution. This is precisely what Gorman’s (1953) aggregation means. In
the presence of idiosyncratic shocks to skills, the variable Λt may change
over time. An exception is a limiting, logarithmic case (η =1 )where we
have Λt =1for all t.






















The corresponding aggregation result is as follows:



































Proof. See Appendix A.  
Unless γ = σ, the addilog utility function (11) is not similarly quasi-
homothetic, and aggregation in the sense of Gorman (1953) is not possible,
even if the diﬀerences in wealth are the only source of heterogeneity. Indeed,
even if bs
t =1for all t, s, we still have that the value of Xt ≡ X depends
on a speciﬁc distribution of welfare weights and aﬀects the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure in the social utility function
(12). In the quasi-homothetic case, γ = σ, Gorman’s (1953) representative
consumer exists if agents are heterogeneous only in wealth (then, Xt =1for
any distribution of welfare weights), however, it does not exist if agents are
10heterogeneous in both wealth and skills. With idiosyncratic shocks to skills,
Xt can change over time if σ  =1 . The fact that the addilog preferences
are consistent with aggregation was ﬁrst mentioned by Shafer (1977), who
showed that such preferences lead to a negative semideﬁnite Slutsky matrix.
Atkeson and Ogaki (1996) derived a closed-form expression for the social
utility function for the case in which agents are heterogeneous in wealth.
In order to complete the characterization of the aggregate dynamics, we
must also look at the labor-market variables. Note that the ”labor” vari-
able in the constructed representative-consumer models is not physical hours
worked, nt, but rather eﬃciency hours worked, ht. We establish the relation-
ship between nt and ht with the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Assume that all agents have identical preferences of either
the CRRA type (8) or the addilog type (11).T h e n ,nt and ht are related as
nt =1− (1 − ht) · πt, (14)




























Proof. See Appendix A.  
The behavior of the aggregate physical hours worked, nt, in the studied
heterogeneous-agent economies is, therefore, completely characterized by ht
and πt. We refer to the variable πt as a labor-input shock.
Summarizing, the ﬂuctuations in the constructed representative-consumer
models result from three diﬀerent kinds of shocks. The ﬁrst one, θt, allows
for a standard interpretation of technological innovations and is due to the
stochastic behavior of the aggregate level of skills, θt = β
1−α
t .G i v e n t h a t
this shock is independent of distributions, its driving process can be modeled
as in the benchmark one-consumer setup by Kydland and Prescott (1982).
The second kind of shock is given by Λt in the CRRA case, and by Xt
11in the addilog case. Such shocks cause variations in the preferences of the
representative consumer. Speciﬁcally, Λt acts as a shock to the discounting
of the whole social utility function, whereas Xt aﬀects only the discounting of
the leisure term. Finally, the third kind of shock, πt,i n ﬂuences the behavior
of physical hours worked, nt, exclusively. The stochastic properties of the
preference and labor-input shocks depend on speciﬁc assumptions about the
welfare weights, {λ
s}




In this section, we complement our theoretical analysis by presenting the
results from a numerical exercise. We speciﬁcally focus on the question how
idiosyncratic productivity shocks can aﬀect aggregate dynamics of the stan-
dard neoclassical stochastic growth model. With the aggregation results in
hand, we can study this question in a relatively simple manner, since we are
able to infer the equilibrium in our heterogeneous-agent economy by essen-
tially solving a one-consumer model. We ﬁrst outline the methodology of our
numerical analysis and then discuss the simulation results.
4.1 Methodology
For the most part, our calibration is standard to the real business cycle
literature. We set the capital share in the Cobb-Douglas production function
at α =0 .36. The parameters d and δ and the utility function parameters µ
and A in the CRRA and addilog utility functions, respectively, are chosen
so that in the non-stochastic steady state, the homogeneous-agent version
of the model replicates the following four statistics: consumption to output
ratio c/y =0 .745, capital to output ratio k/y =1 0 .237, per-quarter output
growth rate g =1 .0047, and the average hours worked n =0 .31.T h e ﬁrst
three ﬁgures are our own estimates, computed from time series data from the
U.S. economy (the description of the U.S. data used is provided in Appendix
B). The forth ﬁgure is the estimate for hours worked, in terms of discretionary
time, reported by Juster and Staﬀord (1991). Regarding the remaining utility
function parameters, in the CRRA case, we consider η ∈ {0.5, 1, 2},a n di n
the addilog case, we set γ =1and consider σ ∈ {0.5, 2}.
To calibrate idiosyncratic shocks, we assume that the stochastic process




t + βt. As regards the individual component, es
t, we assume es
t ∼





βt, changes with the aggregate level of skills, βt,w h i c hl e a d st on o n -
trivial dynamics of the preferences and labor-input shocks over the business
cycle.2 We examine two values of ν ∈ {0.2, 0.4},w h i c ha r ei nl i n ew i t ht h o s e
used in Aiyagari (1994). Regarding the aggregate level of skills, βt, we assume
that it follows an AR(1) process, logβt = ρlogβt−1+εt with  t ∼ N (0,V2).
Given that θt = β
1−α
t , the corresponding process for the technology shock
is logθt = ρlogθt−1 + εt (1 − α).W e c h o o s e ρ =0 .95 and V (1 − α)=
0.007, which makes the process for θt in our model identical to the one in
the standard one-consumer neoclassical stochastic growth model, considered,
e.g., in Hansen (1985). Although the individual skills could, in principle,
have negative values, this is not very probable under the parameterizations
considered here, and has never occurred in our simulations.
Following Kydand (1984, 1995), we calibrate the distribution of welfare
weights, {λ
s}
s∈S, by matching the empirical distribution of hours worked.3
We approximate the latter distribution by using the 1989 cross-section from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides information
about 7114 U.S. households. To be more precise, we ﬁrst take the variable
”annual hours worked by the head of the household” (the PSID mnemonics
16335) and normalize its mean to 0.31.W et h e ns e tbs
t =1for all s,a n df o r
each considered value of η in the CRRA case and σ in the addilog case, we
solve for the welfare weights satisfying equilibrium conditions (37) and (43),
respectively (see Appendix A).
Before computing numerical solutions, we converted the constructed
representative-consumer models into stationary ones by using the standard
change of variables: h ct = ctg−t and h kt = ktg−t.T oﬁnd numerical solutions,
we employ the variant of the parameterized expectation algorithm proposed
by den Haan and Marcet (1990). To approximate the conditional expecta-
tions, we use the ﬁrst-order degree exponentiated polynomial. The simulation
length is 10000. The iterations are performed until 5-digit precision in the
2If we assume that the individual skills are multiplicative in the individual and aggre-













tdωs, does not depend on βt. With a continuum of agents,
the preference and labor input shocks therefore exhibit no dynamics.
3One can also calibrate the weights to match some other empirical distributions, such
as the one of consumption or wealth. The model might have diﬃculty in accounting for
all the distributional facts simultaneously (see Maliar and Maliar, 2001, for a discussion).
13polynomial coeﬃcients is enforced.
The simulation results under the CRRA and addilog utility functions
are shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. For comparison, we also provide
the corresponding statistics for the U.S. economy. The statistics σx and
corr(x,y) are the volatility of a variable xt and the correlation between
variables xt and yt, respectively. The statistics in Tables1 and 2 are sample
averages of the corresponding variables computed for each of 400 simulations.
Each simulation has a duration of 157 periods, as do the time series for the
U.S. economy. Numbers in brackets are the sample standard deviations of
the statistics. Before calculating any statistics, we converted the time series
generated by the stationary models into growing ones. To compute the second
moments for both the U.S. and the artiﬁcial economies, we take the variables
that were logged and detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a
penalty parameter equal to 1600.
4.2 Results
We start by re-examining the quantitative implications of the standard neo-
classical stochastic growth model by Kydland and Prescott (1982) (K&P),
where all agents are identical and where only technology shocks occur. In
Table1, we provide the results for such a model under the logarithmic utility
function, which is a limiting case of both the CRRA utility function under
η =1and the addilog utility function under γ =1 , σ =1 . Kydland and
Prescott’s (1982) model is known to generate most of the statistics in line
with the data but with several notorious exceptions. The most serious fail-
ure of the model is its inability to produce the appropriate comovement of
labor market variables. Speciﬁcally, the model predicts almost perfect pos-
itive correlations between working hours and productivity (yt/nt), between
productivity and output, and between working hours and output, whereas in
actual economies, such correlations are substantially lower.4 The sensitivity
results, reported in columns ”K&P” of Tables 1 and 2, demonstrate that
the problems encountered under the benchmark ”log-log” parameterization
cannot be resolved by changing the parameters of the utility functions.
4The fact that labor supply and productivity are weakly correlated in the data is known
as the ”Dunlop-Tarshis observation” after J.Dunlop (1938) and L.Tarshis (1939). The
failure of a one-shock neoclassical model to account for the Dunlop-Tarshis observation is
well-known in the literature (see Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, for a discussion).
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Table 1. Selected statistics for the U.S. and artificial economies: the Cobb-Douglas case. 
 




























































































































































































































































































a The description of the U.S. data used is provided in Appendix B.   




Table 2. Selected statistics for the U.S. and artificial economies: the addilog case. 
 





















































































































































































































a The description of the U.S. data used is provided in Appendix B.   
 We now turn to the predictions of the heterogeneous-agent (HA) variant
of the model. We shall ﬁrst recall that the eﬀect of idiosyncratic productivity
shocks on the aggregate dynamics is fully summarized by the shocks Λt and πt
in the CRRA case and Xt and πt in the addilog case. The preference shocks,
Λt and Xt,a ﬀect all of the model’s variables, whereas the labor-input shock,
πt,i n ﬂuences only physical hours worked, nt. (Note that in the ”log-log” case,
there is no preference shock but still there is a labor-input shock). Given
that the technology shock, θt, follows the same stochastic process in the
homogeneous- and heterogeneous-agent economies, any diﬀerence between
aggregate ﬂuctuations of the two economies must come from the preference
and labor-input shocks.
The regularities we observe in Tables1 and 2 are as follows: In all the con-
sidered cases, the predictions of the heterogeneous- and homogeneous-agent
models about the cyclical behavior of output, investment and consumption
are practically identical. We therefore conclude that the eﬀect of the pref-
erence shocks on aggregate dynamics is not quantitatively signiﬁcant. This
result is a consequence of the very low volatility of the preference shocks (see
σΛ and σX in the CRRA and addilog cases, respectively).
In contrast, the labor-market statistics, produced by the heterogeneous-
and homogeneous-agent versions of the model, can diﬀer markedly. The
heterogeneous-agent model, for example, can generate the correlation be-
tween working hours and productivity, which ranges from strongly positive
to strongly negative. A negative correlation is obtained when the values of
η and σ in the CRRA and addilog cases, respectively, are lower than one
and when the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks is large (ν =0 .4).A s i m i -
lar tendency is observed regarding the correlation between productivity and
output.
What, precisely, reduces the above correlations in the heterogeneous-
agent case as compared to the homogeneous-agent one? Given that the
preference shocks have little impact on aggregate dynamics, the behavior
of eﬃciency hours worked in the heterogeneous-agent model, ht, is roughly
the same as that of physical hours worked in the homogeneous-agent model.
In turn, the dynamics of physical hours worked in the heterogeneous-agent
model, nt, can be characterized by ht and πt. In particular, according to
(14),w eh a v e
dnt = −(1 − ht)dπt + πtdht,
where dxt denotes a diﬀerential of a variable xt. Suppose that the economy
17experiences a change in technology, dθt. As follows from Tables1 and 2,t h e
correlation between the technology shock θt and the labor-input shock πt is
negative, which indicates that the sign of dπt is opposite to that of the tech-
nology change, dθt. Furthermore, in all the cases considered, we have πt > 1.5
These two results imply that physical hours worked are more responsive to
technological changes than eﬃciency hours worked, dnt >d h t.6 Under some
parametrizations, the eﬀect associated with idiosyncratic uncertainty is so
strong that the volatility of working hours in the heterogeneous-agent model
exceeds the volatility of output, σn/σy > 1. The consequence is that a pos-
itive (negative) technology shock drives the productivity yt/nt down (up),
which makes the correlation between nt and yt/nt negative. The problem we
face, in this case, is exactly the opposite to the one we had in the benchmark
homogeneous-agent setup!
We also perform the sensitivity analysis. First, we explore the robustness
of our results to variations in the utility function parameters, such as η in
t h eC R R Ac a s ea n dγ, σ in the addilog case. The tendencies described in
t h i ss e c t i o np r o v e dt ob er o b u s tt os u c hm o d i ﬁcations. Furthermore, we
consider an alternative speciﬁcation of the process for idiosyncratic shocks,





t + βt),w h e r eβ
s is the long-run average of skills
of the agent s. To calibrate this version of the model, we assume the same
processes for es
t and βt as before, and we proxy β
s by the variable ”hourly






sdωs, we solve for the welfare weights satisfying (37) and (43)
in the CRRA and addilog cases, respectively. We ﬁnd that the predictions
produced by this version of the model are very similar to those we described
before.
5Note that even if πt exhibits no ﬂuctuations, i.e., πt = π for all t,i tc a ns t i l la ﬀect
aggregate dynamics because the value of π determines the volatility of physical hours
worked. In a neoclassical growth model with permanent diﬀerences in skills considered
in Maliar and Maliar (2001), the presence of such a constant parameter improves the
predictions of the model on labor-market statistics.
6Thus, our heterogeneous-agent model reproduces the empirical regularity, documented
by Hansen (1993) and Kydland and Prescott (1993), that physical hours worked are more
volatile than eﬃciency hours worked.
185C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the implications of the neoclassical growth model, where
agents experience idiosyncratic shocks to earnings. We show that if markets
are complete, and if agents have identical preferences of either the CRRA
or the addilog type, then there exists a closed-form expression for the social
utility function. By using this result, we construct a representative-consumer
model that describes the aggregate dynamics of the heterogeneous-agent
economy. Under our construction, the eﬀect of idiosyncratic uncertainty
on the aggregate dynamics is summarized by three kinds of shocks: to tech-
nology, to preferences and to labor input. In a calibrated version of the
model, we ﬁnd that the eﬀect of the preference shocks on the economy’s ag-
gregate behavior is modest. The labor-input shocks, on the contrary, play an
important role in the aggregate dynamics. For example, unlike the bench-
mark Kydland and Prescott’s (1982) setup, our heterogeneous-agent model
can generate either procyclical, acyclical or countercyclical behavior of labor
productivity, depending on the model’s parameterization.
We should point out that the possibility of aggregation, in the context
of the neoclassical growth model, is not limited to the two settings consid-
ered in this paper. Several possible extensions of our results are as follows:
First, our example of aggregation under the assumption of the addilog utility
functions can be generalized to the case in which agents have any identical
additive utility functions, with each additive component being a member of
the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class. Secondly, our aggre-
gation results also hold when the individual utility functions are modiﬁed to
include agent-speciﬁc subsistence levels of consumption and leisure. Thirdly,
in all the cases distinguished, we can achieve the same kind of aggregation
if agents face two types of idiosyncratic shocks, one to skills and another
to preferences, with the latter shock being introduced as in Example 1.7 In
particular, for the two-shock settings with the CRRA and addilog utility
functions, the results of our Propositions 2, 3 and 4 carry over with a for-
mal replacement of λ
s by the term λ
sφ
s
t. Finally, if the individual utility
functions are given by an increasing power transformation of the Constant
Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functions and are identical up to possibly
diﬀerent subsistence levels, then the aggregation is possible in the economy
7The fact that the economy with idiosyncratic shocks to the discount factor allows for
aggregation was pointed out to us by associate editor Per Krusell.
19with preference shocks (but not in the one with the productivity shocks).
As a ﬁnal comment, we shall mention that the technology and preference
shocks in the constructed representative-consumer models can be viewed as
aggregate supply and demand shocks, respectively. Supply shocks are com-
monly used in current macroeconomic literature. Demand shocks have been
believed, for a long time, to play an important role in economics, e.g., in Key-
nesian economies, but they are rarely used nowadays. Our aggregation re-
sults provide theoretical foundations for the assumption of aggregate demand
shocks. For the moment, we have not found suﬃcient empirical evidence to
support such shocks. This issue warrants further investigation.
206 Appendices
Appendix A presents the proofs to Propositions 1-4. Appendix B describes
the data used for computing the statistics on the U.S. economy.
6.1 Appendix A
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . We prove this proposition by showing that a
competitive equilibrium in the decentralized economy (1) − (4) satisﬁes the
optimality conditions of the planner’s problem (5), (6).
The First Order Conditions (FOCs) of the consumer’s optimization prob-











 ) · Π{Bt+1 = B




































































t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the agent’s budget con-
straint (2),a n du1 and u2 denote the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of the
function u with respect to the ﬁrst and second arguments, respectively. To
obtain conditions (18) and (20),w eu s et h ef a c tt h a t ,i ne q u i l i b r i u m ,rt and
wt are equal to the marginal products of capital and labor, respectively.


















s for all t. (22)
Thus, we have that the ratio of marginal utilities of any two consumers is
constant across time and states of nature, which is the usual consequence
21of the assumption of complete markets. Result (22) implies that the indi-








































































This follows after integrating (26) over the set of agents and imposing market
clearing conditions for claims,
U
S ms
t+1 (B)dωs =0for all B ∈  .
Consider now the planner’s problem (5), (6). The FOCs of the subprob-

























where ϕt and κt are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints
on the aggregate consumption and labor, respectively. The envelope condi-





















22where U1 and U2 denote the ﬁrst-order partial derivatives of the function U
with respect to the ﬁrst and second arguments, respectively.
By ﬁnding the FOCs of the subproblem (6) and its transversality condi-
tion and by combining them with (28)−(31), we obtain that the solution to
the planner’s problem is described by conditions (23)−(25) and (27),w h i c h
proves the statement of the proposition.  
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the assumption of the CRRA utility










t(1−µ)(1−η) = ϕt, (32)
λ
s (1 − µ)(c
s
t)








By solving (32), (33) with respect to cs
t and (1 − ns
t)bs




































Integration of (34) and (35) yields ct and (1 − ht), respectively. We then
divide cs
t by ct and (1 − ns
t)bs




























−(1−µ)(1−η)/η dωs · (1 − ht). (37)
The result of the proposition follows after substitution of (36) and (37) into
the deﬁnition of the social utility function (5).  
23Proof of Proposition 3. In the case of the addilog utility function, FOCs














Solving (38), (39) for cs

























We compute ct and (1 − ht) by integrating (40) and (41), respectively. After
dividing cs
t by ct and (1 − ns
t)bs

























1−1/σ dωs · (1 − ht). (43)
Substitution of (42) and (43) into deﬁnition (5) completes the proof.  
Proof of Proposition 4. In the CRRA case, conditions (14) and (15)
follow after integration of (37). Similarly, in the addilog case, conditions (14)
and (16) follow after integration of (43).  
6.2 Appendix B
To compute the empirical statistics, we use quarterly data on the U.S. econ-
omy ranging from 1959 : 3 to 1998 : 3 . The variable consumption ct in
the model is deﬁned as real personal expenditures on nondurables and ser-
vices in the data. Investment it in the model is real personal consumption
24of durables and real ﬁxed private investment in the data. Consequently, the
series for output are constructed by adding-up consumption and investment,
yt = ct+it. The variable working hours nt in the model is deﬁned as the level
of the civilian employment premultiplied by average weakly hours worked
in private nonagricultural establishments in the data. Before computing the
estimates, the constructed series are converted in per-capita terms by us-
ing the eﬃciency measure of the U.S. population. The data are taken from
the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint-Louis data base (mnemonics FPIC92,
PCEDG92,P C E N D C 92, PCECS92,C E 16OV, AWHNONAG). The
sources for these series are the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. De-
partment of Commerce.
As a measure of labor productivity (wage), we use the variable yt/nt. To
verify that the constructed measure of labor productivity behaves similarly
to the one in the U.S. economy, we compared this measure to the CITIBASE
variable LBOUTU, which is the output per-hour of all the persons in the
nonagricultural business sector. We ﬁnd that the two measures are very
similar. Speciﬁcally, if instead of yt/nt,w eu s et h ev a r i a b l eLBOUTU, then
we have σy/n/σy =0 .583,c o r r (y/n,n)=0 .220 and corr(y/n,y)=0 .543,
which are close to the corresponding statistics reported in the tables.
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